Commentary

A Veteran Railroader’s Perspective on East Palestine and the Rail Industry’s Future

Written by Richard L. Beadles
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Fire fighters receive instruction on a safety train tank car. Norfolk Southern photo

As a long-retired railroad president and current rail and transportation aficionado—but certainly not an expert—I was encouraged by a friend to offer my perspective on the Norfolk Southern freight train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio.

Much criticism has been directed at Norfolk Southern. While it is understandable that the locals are very concerned, the media has had a field day quoting misinformed and agenda-advancing “experts” on rail safety, “corporate greed” and environmental degradation.

Let me say from the outset that I have never been to East Palestine, nor am I familiar with NS operations at that location, But I do know a little bit about the rail industry and its recent history, including train operations. While my days of hands-on rail operations are long gone, some principles are timeless. Here in Richmond, Va., I observe NS operations and maintenance, and I have every reason to believe that the quality of maintenance and operation on that Ohio line segment was exceptionally high.

First, I shall speculate on the origins of the suspected ill-fated railcar bearing/wheelset assembly that apparently failed on Feb. 3. The loads of vinyl chloride originated a long distance from where NS picked up the train at interchange, destined undoubtedly to a PVC or other plastics manufacturer in the Northeast for ultimate consumption and conversion into a finished product for U.S. consumers. Thus, we all have a stake in the process of transporting vinyl chloride and other related chemical products classified as hazardous materials (hazmat). Such chemical products are used in the manufacture of thousands of products eagerly purchased and consumed by the general public.

Because rail freight is usually the least-expensive, safest and most convenient mode of transportation, storage, and consumption by consignees of chemical shippers’ products, producers and users tend to utilize high-capacity rail tank cars for hazmat movement (not all are so classified). While railroads such as NS will tell you they are legally obligated to accept and move such shipments because of their common carrier status (an antiquated regulatory term more honored in theory than practice), the U.S. rail industry covets this business because it commands high freight transportation charges, and thus tends to be quite profitable.

The carloads of vinyl chloride in the accident did not move in a railroad-owned car. Almost all such cars are owned by shippers, or more commonly, by equipment leasing companies. This will be a very important issue in the case of claims for loss, damage and other accident-related costs. It was not an NS-owned freight car that caused the problem.

The subject car almost certainly moved from its origin to an interchange point with NS on another railroad, or railroads. There may even be arguments that these other connecting railroads share some responsibility if subsequent laboratory tests indicate the proximate case of the ultimate component failure dates back in time prior to NS acceptance of the car at the point of interchange. Legal finger-pointing possibilities are endless.

While NS undoubtedly inspected the subject railcar at the interchange point, such interchange inspections tend to be visual rather than high-tech affairs. Thus, any latent defect, if there was one, may not have been revealed. Once placed into the 149-car NS freight train operating from Madison, Ill., to Conway, Pa., the car would have been monitored many times by wayside HBDs (hot bearing detectors), which respond to above-normal heat emanating from the car wheel and axle bearing assembly. Any potential defect registered by an HBD is immediately communicated to the train crew, and the train is immediately stopped for inspection. Apparently, no such alarms were registered prior to the one located just before the derailment site. At that point, the train crew responded with a normal brake application with dynamic braking to stop the train, when the derailment simultaneously occurred.

At this point, just what occurred will have to await completion of the ongoing National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation. What follows is my speculation based only upon my own train operating experience and history of rail freight derailments.

The standard rail air brake system is such that normal (non-emergency) brake applications are initiated from the head end of the train by the locomotive engineer, and simultaneously by an EOT (end of train) device. The actual braking action occurs in sequence, with a very slight delay, car after car, until fully applied. Because of this characteristic, it has traditionally been customary for the locomotive engineer to defer reducing power until all brakes throughout the train have applied. Otherwise, due partially to slack in the train, the rear end tends to run into the head end. Accordingly, an engineer seeks to keep the cars stretched until braking is fully activated—a very short but real time interval. Thereafter, it is a matter of increasing braking and/or reducing throttle power to stop, if that is what is desired, in a fully controlled manner, at the desired location. What I have described is something that is real, but not an unacceptable condition.

An emergency brake application tends to pre-empt the above-described train-handling strategy. Moreover, an undesired emergency application (one not initiated by the locomotive engineer) can have other dynamic effects, depending upon at what point in the train such braking action was initiated. Brake applications may and do occur automatically, and by design, whenever there is a failure of continuity in the train line air brake system, for example, a break in the air hoses carrying the line between freight cars, or when there is a separation between cars, as in the case of a derailment. Obviously, the more freight cars in the train, the more significant the emergency brake application effect.

The NS train in the derailment had one DP (distributed power) locomotive remotely controlled by the engineer operating from the head end. I have no operating experience with DP, but I believe that its use could either reduce the severity of adverse impacts resulting from undesired brake applications, or more ominously, compound the compression problem.

From aerial photos of the accident, it is obvious that enormous force was thrust upon the initially derailing car or cars by the trailing (rear) portion of the train. We presume that a truck assembly from the defective car, one of its roller bearings mostly likely already ablaze, simply collapsed upon the track structure while in motion, precipitating a classic freight car pileup. Freight cars separated very early in the derailment process, and an emergency brake application occurred on every car. It is reported that 37 freight cars were forcefully driven into the pileup, powered in part by the residual momentum of however many cars followed. The initial source of the fire was obvious, and shearing and tearing of metal would have been enough to ignite any leaking non-metallic flammable material. The operating speed was below 50 mph.

Emergency response by NS and local providers seems not to have raised any questions. What transformed this incident into weeks of national media coverage was the subsequent controlled release and burn of the contents of one or more cars, where pressure relief valves were found to be inoperative without human intervention. The huge black cloud insured unrelenting nationwide coverage and attracted “cause” opportunists from near and far. Even though this was done with the approval of proper authorities and under their supervision, that has not limited the criticism directed at NS as reported in the national media’s treatment of the accident. And sometimes for clear partisan political purposes, the White House, EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and other federal authorities have likewise been criticized.

NS received special public censure for “backing out” of a previously announced local town hall meeting. The railroad’s decision in this instance undoubtedly originated with the NS Law Department, which, together with the assistance of outside counsel, will have to defend the company against litigation. Experience has shown the rail industry that it is a prime target for claimants with real or imagined injury, loss, etc. As part of corporate defense strategy, it is essential to minimize the number of company representatives responding to questions at public events or being interviewed by local news outlet personnel, almost none of whom would have any background in the matters they are disseminating to the public, including a nation of hungry attorneys anxious to represent the local residents of East Palestine in potential class action suits.

To date, there have been no reports of injury or death attributable to the accident. There are many local citizens complaining of all kinds of symptoms, which may or may not be related to the accident. NS is doing all the normal and customary things to mitigate the hardship of local residents. And as of Feb. 18, NS CEO Alan Shaw visited town leaders and other responsible officials, once again offering assurances that the railroad is not going to shirk its responsibility for environmental and other remediation, nor for legitimate claims for loss, damage or personal harm.

Shamefully, but not unexpectedly, some rail labor representatives (and politicians) have been loud and irresponsible in their allegations of “corporate greed.” They seem never to be happy. Full disclosure: I am biased against attacks by workers upon employers. Greed is often a factor in business, but the background story on rail is much more complicated.

I am nevertheless very concerned about the direction U.S. rail service (or lack thereof) has taken over the last decade or more. Freight service quality and marketability has declined as railroads implemented operational changes designed more to please Wall Street than to satisfy the needs of their rail customers. Treatment of Amtrak has been deplorable.

I agree with those who suggest that the rail freight industry has too often failed the nation’s need for, and interest in, providing a good surface transportation alternative to highways. Pursuit of record low operating ratios greatly diminished the effectiveness of freight rail transportation during recent supply chain problems. Personally, I have been a financial beneficiary as an NS shareholder, but I am no less concerned. The Class I railroads, I feel, have let the nation down.

That said, the immense core U.S. rail network is in better physical condition than I have seen in my lifetime. But unfortunately, we have lost about one-half of our national rail transport and movement capacity over the past 40-plus  years since partial deregulation under Staggers. Much of the reason is the result of public policy decisions that have made rail less and less attractive to shippers and travelers, and conversely making highways more attractive to commercial truckers and others.

Make no mistake: I am not an advocate of a return to rail regulation we once suffered under when administered pursuant to the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act. That regime was itself one of the factors that drove the U.S. rail industry into near total financial ruin by the late 1960s. Fortunately, in my opinion, the current U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB) appears to be seeking to rebalance public interest vs. Wall Street dominance of rail corporate management.

I don’t think any of this contributed in any way to the East Palestine accident. Moreover, NS has a new CEO who is taking steps toward putting NS back on the path to corporate respectability. The same has occurred at CSX, which likewise has a new CEO. Joe Hinrichs. I am counting on both to make a positive difference, and hoping Wall Street—including the hedge fund raiders—will give them time to do so. Securities funds managers are, after all, the driving forces responsible for much of the corporate behavior of railroad companies. And to make matters worse, most of us have investment positions, through retirement and other plans, with the much maligned corporate “raiders.” Yes, it is complicated.

The alternative is to divert vinyl chloride and hazmat to our Interstate highways. Anybody in favor of that?

Richard L. Beadles was formerly President and CEO of CSX predecessor Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad. Now 86, He has served as director, board member and fellow at the Virginia Rail Policy Institute. Beadles considers himself to be an independent rail and transportation analyst, and an advocate of rail and transit development. He believes that a major shift in national transportation infrastructure funding and development policies and priorities will be necessary in order to effectively address current and future energy, environmental, quality of life, and global economic competitiveness challenges. Originally a hands-on railroader, up from the ranks, Beadles had a wide variety of operating, marketing and executive experience from the 1950s until retirement. As a former President and CEO of the RF&P and later of CSX Realty, the former real estate and development unit of CSX Corp., he went on to lead Richmond-based real estate advisory firm MGT Realty Advisors, until a second retirement several years ago. Immersed in land use and transportation issues of Northern Virginia between 1965 and 1995, Beadles came to appreciate the linkage between urban development and transportation challenges, and to see the opportunities for better utilization of rail corridors. He was directly involved in the development of Crystal City as RF&P’s principal officer in charge of the railroad’s land redevelopment effort at the former Potomac Yard in Arlington and Alexandria, Va. Later, with CSX, he was similarly engaged in urban real estate and transportation in various cities in the eastern half of the U.S., including Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Atlanta, Chicago, and elsewhere, including James Center in downtown Richmond. As a member of for Virginia Governor Mark Warner’s 2004 Rail Study Commission, Beadles played a supporting role in the creation of the Virginia Rail Enhancement Fund and its companion facility, the State Rail Advisory Board. Subsequently, Governor Warner appointed Beadles to the Rail Advisory Board. An alumnus of the Business School at Virginia Commonwealth University, Beadles has i served on the VCU Board of Visitors, and was a charter member of the VCU Real Estate Foundation. At one time he chaired the VCU real estate program’s external support group. More also served as chairman of the Port of Richmond Commission. He delights in opportunities to combine involvement in urban planning and transportation, but his current passion is preservation of the best of rural America and the protection of Virginia’s environment. The opinions expressed here are his own.

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