With Railway Age since 1992, Bill Vantuono has broadened and deepened the magazine's coverage of the technological revolution that is so swiftly changing the industry. He has also strengthened Railway Age's leadership position in industry affairs with the conferences he conducts on operating passenger trains on freight railroads and communications-based train control.
By Douglas John Bowen, Managing Editor
Dallas gets it. It’s expanding its existing light rail
transit network, augmenting regional rail, and bolstering existing Amtrak
service, even as it faces the bumpy realities of advancing high speed rail.
Texas’ second-largest city has a real-world, practical hold on matters mixed
with a vision of what can be. Combine those elements with the ubiquitous
optimism and “can-do” attitude all Texans seem to carry, and you have a potent
force much of the U.S. would do well to emulate.
And please forget “right” or “left”; in this case; Dallas is
front and center, in some ways perhaps the ambitious edge of the current U.S.
passenger rail renaissance.
My latest trip to Dallas in late January only reaffirmed
this, even as I delighted over the passenger rail progress the city has
notched. More than many places, Dallas residents and officials, be it DART
President Gary Thomas or a taxicab driver, mix that powerful Texas pride with a
practical “what’s up in your town” inquiry. Where other cities pump up
boosterism to an extreme, Dallas (I’ve found) seeks real information. “We’ve
got this problem; do you? How are you guys dealing with it?” reflects an
honesty, an open-mindedness, that bodes well both for urban rail transit and
any future HSR development.
DART President Thomas and his staff are justly proud of the
agency, and it shows. But more than they might know or sense, DART is a pointed
refutation of the naysayers insisting passenger rail transit will not work and
does not affect development, that it’s meant for only us “rat-grey New Yorkers”
(in author Tom Wolfe’s words) who don’t know any better. It’s bolstered and
energized Dallas’ downtown, a downtown long ignored per many U.S. “cities” but
reasserting itself as a real place with a real purpose.
I base that not just on the gracious guided tour of new
construction provided me by DART Director, Media Relations Morgan Lyons—a task
he performed with relish and with obvious pride—but on my own multiple trips on
DART’s Red and Blue lines. I saw “those people” (commuters) but also saw
students, shoppers, and travelers with other purposes, generating on-off
traffic for many stations along the routes.
One of those stops is at Union Station and the Reunion
Center complex, served by DART, Trinity Rail Express (TRE) regional rail
service linking Dallas with Fort Worth, and Amtrak. In the 1980s, a refurbished
Union Station stood more as a monument to the past—almost a mausoleum—with few
passengers coming or going. Not anymore; it may not yet be 30th Street Station
in Philadelphia, but rail passengers now are in evidence throughout much of the
day. A modest four Amtrak trains
per day don’t do Dallas justice. But it’s
more than six trains a week and, along with TRE’s presence and DART
service, the station is set to welcome whatever HSR (or even just HrSR) might
That last component won’t arrive immediately. Advocates
gathering at the historic Magnolia Hotel for the 6th Annual Southwestern Rail
Conference, “Turning Vision into Reality” Jan. 29, were clearly disappointed when FRA Deputy
Administrator Karen Rae, the luncheon speaker, affirmed what the group already
had heard the day before: Texas wouldn’t get the big bucks for any HSR project,
at least in the first round. Rae delivered the “bad” news as diplomatically as
she could, saying, “Should you be disappointed and concerned? You should be
focused” on proceeding with HSR cohesively.
Indeed, even before Rae addressed the group, Texas DOT
Executive Director Amadeo Saenz allowed that the state needed a “comprehensive”
approach to HSR, noting Texas submissions to FRA during 2009 were “fractured”
into nine distinct projects or pieces. But Saenz remained upbeat, noting TexDOT
now has a Rail Division to guide the state “in focusing on a comprehensive
[statewide] rail plan.” The words and labels matter, Saenz said: “Not too long
ago, we all were ‘the highway department.’”
Beyond accepting reality, and vowing (in Saenz’s words) that
“we learned from what we did” and perhaps didn’t do, Texas HSR advocates also
showed their magnanimous side to the FRA “winners.” Those assembled bore no
demonstrative grudge in congratulating California, Florida, and Chicago-St.
Louis for their first-round fiscal victories. Many took time to congratulate conference moderator Fritz
Plous, a Chicago resident and longtime rail advocate, for Chicago’s successful
HrSR bid, something perhaps Rep.
John Mica (R-Fla.) could learn to emulate rather than acting as a sore winner.
In Dallas, they get it. Here’s
hoping they get the real thing, HSR, real soon.
By Richard F. Timmons
President, American Short line
and Regional Railroad Association
In the midst of unprecedented and historic regulatory changes demanding our attention and resources during the past year, short line railroads had the safest year in our history!
In the past 18 months, challenging new laws and regulations have swept across our industry, demanding investments, time, and new procurement, as well as customer and union acceptance. These changes will be felt during the next decade as we strive to comply with numerous phased-in requirements intended to enhance railroad safety across the industry. While many of these initiatives have merit, the difficulty is how to pay for them. These unfunded mandates will prove to be a significant burden in the years ahead, one that must not intrude on our daily safety focus.
These ongoing requirements notwithstanding, the questions of why and how our segment of the railroad industry has achieved this significant safety milestone are worthy of consideration. The continuous rail industry focus on every aspect of safety is the backbone of the dramatic downward trend for all railroads in terms of injuries and fatalities. This safety conscious orientation began about 20 years ago and has proven its value through years of steady improvements.
And while no fatality or injury is ever acceptable, the reduction in both categories over the years is commendable and demonstrates the wisdom of the determined approach that railroads, large and small, have applied to safety. This focus and determination to reduce accidents, injuries, and fatalities started at the senior levels of management and has ultimately been embraced by every functional level in the railroad industry. The perseverance of rail leadership to protect employees, the public, and rail resources, and the improved metrics-based approach used to understand weakness in our systems, receives the bulk of the credit for the dramatic safety changes in the railroad industry.
For 2009, Class II and III railroads logged a total of 26,160,055 employee hours over 52,000 miles of railroad. Operating on that system, 563 short lines experienced 1 fatality and 441 injuries. This is a 7% reduction in fatalities and a 25% reduction in injuries from 2008 with just 17% fewer hours operated. This is a record for the short line industry and a tribute to the competence of those railroaders at every level that are responsible for such impressive results.
But this has been a challenging path we have traveled over a number of years. I believe there are many contributing factors that have made this record possible. As mentioned earlier, the consistent safety focus and the measurements developed to assess progress have made clear to management and employees where we stood and what demanded our attention and resources year over year.
The obvious shortcomings described by an annual analysis prompted numerous training initiatives from both internal short line resources as well as partnerships with the Class I community and TTCI. In addition, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association sponsored programs and classes, and in partnership with the FRA hosted a variety of training events over the years that were necessary for compliance. Additionally, ASLRRA provided templates, documents, procedures, programs, and on-site safety assessments to assist small railroads in continuously working to improve their safety posture.
Possibly the most effective safety initiative was the establishment of the ASLRRA Safety and Training Committee. This body of short line railroad members has been instrumental in creating products, programs, and safety policies that contributed significantly to the improved safety performance of small railroads. Their individual and collective contributions have been invaluable.
The difficult and challenging work of this committee coupled with its involvement with the ASLRRA Safety Awards recognition program each year has served to highlight individual and short line railroad company performance, and rewarded those members and companies whose efforts have paid off with improved annual results.
At the end of the day, these exceptional outcomes boil down to people. Railroaders are responsible for these results, and their professionalism, training, awareness, and dedication to doing their jobs correctly every day under all conditions make for safe operations. The results are evident. We will continue to strive to achieve these high standards in the coming months and years. There is no alternative for railroaders and their companies because safety our the first priority.
By Jerry Vest
Almost 20 years ago, federal surface transportation policy changed for the better. Enactment of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) meant the days of Congress simply passing a “highway bill” were over. Since then, Congress has expanded the multimodal focus of surface transportation public policy. An integrated approach allows for better policy decisions through the reauthorization process, with each mode recognized for its own strengths and role in ground transportation.With the most recent surface transportation bill, SAFETEA-LU, up for renewal, discussions include the national limits on truck sizes and weights. This issue could have a dramatic and possibly unintended impact on the future health of ground transportation in the U.S. A handful of trucking companies and freight shippers are seeking to include in reauthorization higher federal highway truck weight and size limits. Their arguments are simply not good public policy.First, proponents of heavier and larger trucks suggest that by allowing such trucks, fewer trucks will be on the roadways, producing less highway congestion, less pollution, and fewer accidents. These claims are not based on the properties of bigger trucks themselves, but on the idea that fewer total trucks will be required to move freight.But as demonstrated by diversion studies done in 2007 by Carl Martland of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in 2009 by TTX Co., a tremendous diversion of freight from rail to truck would occur with increased federal weight and size limits. According to the Martland study, allowing a 97,000-pound national weight limit would divert 44% of all merchandise traffic handled by short line and regional railroads to trucks. The TTX study found that larger trucks would divert almost 25% of all carload and intermodal rail traffic (excluding coal and ores), resulting in 330 billion new truck ton-miles every year. “Bigger but fewer” trucks also fails from a historical perspective: Following every national truck weight limit increase in modern history, more, not fewer, trucks have appeared on our highways.Second, advocates of heavier and larger trucks imply highways will see very little impact. One proposal calls for a third rear trailer axle for tractor-trailers carrying 97,000 pounds, claiming this will result in less pavement damage than a similar 80,000-pound truck with a standard rear tandem trailer. Pavement experts appear to be divided on this, but one can ask: If another trailer axle reduces pavement wear, why don’t trucking companies promoting this view simply add another axle to their 80,000-pound trailers immediately? But there is no doubt that heavier trucks will exacerbate deterioration of roadway bridges, problematic for states facing significant inventories of roadway bridges rated as “substandard.” Heavier trucks will simply make this problem worse.Third, many highway safety experts strongly disagree with the idea that bigger trucks are as safe as current trucks. Both the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association have issued warnings of the safety hazards presented by heavier trucks. Law enforcement agencies across the country, including the National Troopers Coalition and the National Sheriffs’ Association, have formally declared their opposition to bigger trucks. And when higher federal CAFE standards result in smaller and lighter passenger vehicles, heavier trucks sharing public highways ignores the laws of physics, placing all of us driving on the national highway network at a higher level of risk of harm in a truck-auto accident.Finally, federal officials should not overlook the negative impact bigger trucks would have on our multimodal system. The Martland and TTX diversion studies make clear that a substantial reduction in freight rail shipments would occur. This has been confirmed at the state level, when increases in weight allowances on state roads created an almost immediate loss of rail traffic for some short line railroads. The Government Accountability Office understands this, quoting USDOT statistics in stating, “[L]arger trucks weighing over 100,000 pounds pay only 40% of their costs. From an economic standpoint, this relationship between revenue and cost distorts the competitive environment by making it appear that heavier trucks are a less expensive shipping method than they actually are and puts other modes, such as rail and maritime, at a disadvantage.”This is not simply a “railroader vs. trucker” fight. Most people appreciate the role trucking plays in our national economy. But favoring a handful of shippers and trucking companies with cheaper rates or lower costs is not good public policy. Continuing, without change, the current national weight and size limits on all federal highways is the right policy decision, one that all of us need to support.Jerry Vest is Vice President, Government and Industry Affairs for Genesee & Wyoming Inc., which owns and operates short line and regional railroads in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands.
By Tony Kruglinski, Financial Editor
As readers of this column already know, the rail industry has enjoyed more than 30 years of seemingly limitless financing of its equipment needs by banks, insurance companies, and operating lessors. The result? Of the nearly 1.6 million railcars in North America, more than 60% of them are owned by non-railroads and leased to railroads and other industry participants under a variety of financing structures. The costs inherent in these financings have also been regularly subsidized by Uncle Sam as the owners have made use of the depreciation deductions that come with ownership of the equipment and passed a portion of the benefits on to the lessees in the form of lower rents—all in all, a win/win situation for all involved.
However, the financial crisis we have just weathered and a series of pending regulatory changes are likely to severely impact the amount and/or cost of this kind of financing available to the industry in the coming years.
The 25th Anniversary Edition of Railroad Financial Corporation’s Rail Equipment Finance Conference, set for March 6 -9, 2011 in Palm Springs, Calif., is set to tackle this thorny issue of financial capacity for the next generation of rail equipment finance, along with regular agenda items profiling the status of the North American railcar and locomotive fleets.
Since many of our readers won’t be journeying to Palm Springs to be with us, we thought we would use this month’s Financial Edge to at least point out the issues involved in this financial conundrum so that you can track its development in your own situation.
Shrinkage of the operating lessor pool: Perhaps the most easy to observe evidence of a change in the circumstances facing rail equipment operators who do not wish to own their rolling stock is the reduction in the number of operating lessors willing to make substantial purchases of railcars and locomotives for lease to third parties. While the absolute number of rail equipment lessors has only shrunk slightly, the number of players willing to write a big check to take over a large order for an end-user seeking operating lease financing is down materially.
Why? The financial crisis has rocked several of them back on their heels to the point that they are still in the market but seeming reluctant to write big checks. The impact of this situation is somewhat muted at this time by the slow market in new building for railcars and locomotives. The issue, we believe, will become more apparent when the market for new building comes back in the next couple of years and the number and appetite of the operating lessors willing to make big equipment bets has shrunk.
Will this create a huge problem for the industry? Will rents rise materially to compensate for these changes and to lure new players into the market? Will end-users end up purchasing equipment for cash or with debt financing? These are all questions that we intend to examine in March.
Regulatory changes due to impact finance leasing: Over the past months and years, we’ve used this column to highlight pending regulatory changes likely to impact banks and other financial institutions that have been big players in the financing leasing market, which has supported billions of dollars in finance leasing for the rail industry. (With a finance lease, the lessee usually controls the future of the equipment at lease end. Not so with operating leasing, where the lessor recovers the equipment for release.)
For instance, we have warned that capital requirements inherent in the capital adequacy rules generally referred to as Basel II would have a significant impact on long-term leveraged financing leasing (the cheapest type of finance lease available to lessees due to its inherent low-cost debt component).
What’s happened during the past year or two? Virtually all leveraged leasing to the rail industry has been replaced by single-investor leasing (more expensive due to the absence of a low-cost debt component). You can still get your deal financed, but it just costs you more.
We are also awaiting the impact of as-yet-to-be-finalized changes to the account rules relating to just who records what assets and liabilities on its books relative to the kinds of finance transactions that have been the mainstay of rail equipment finance in North America.
The impact of these rule changes will likely be massive. What will these changes likely be when the rules are finalized? How will lessors and lessees react and tailor their transactions as a result? Most important, will the economics of finance leasing change for the worse? These are all questions that, as yet, have no answers, but we are sure to shed further light on them at Rail Equipment Finance 2011. We invite you to join us for this discussion and others that can shape the way you will be doing business in 2011 and beyond. See www.railequipmentfinance.com for information on the conference.
By Mike Ogborn
The Surface Transportation Board is about to embark on a series of hearings that could result in major changes in the railroad industry, including the way railroads compete, price their service, and make capital investment decisions.
The first hearing will be held in February and will review the long-standing exemptions for boxcars, commodities, and TOFC/COFC rate and commodity exemptions. The second hearing will be held in May and will “explore the current state of competitiveness in the railroad industry and possible policy alternatives to facilitate more competition,” including competitive access, bottleneck rates, terminal access, and reciprocal switching.
This announcement comes on the heels of an unsuccessful attempt by the Senate Commerce Committee to draft compromise legislation on these subjects in the 2010 Congress. While we do not know what the end product of these hearings will be, we do know that they will be wide-ranging and deal with issues that go to the heart of the railroad industry’s ability to compete for business and to adequately invest in its infrastructure.
The short line railroad industry will be full participants in these hearings. We have put together an internal process for developing and presenting our position on each issue so as to do everything we can to protect the interests of all short line railroads.
Most important, we will make a substantial effort explaining to the STB how short line ratemaking and service practices work, and how those things are weaved into the fabric of our relationship with the Class I’s.
These are very complex subjects, but a number of simple principles will guide our response to these hearings.
If we are not the problem, do not make us part of the solution. Short line railroad pricing and service practices are not the reason this debate is taking place. Applying blanket solutions to short line railroads will have virtually no impact on the outcome, but will have significant impact on the financial viability of our small businesses.
Short line railroads contribute to competition. The vast majority of short lines were created to preserve or enhance rail service where it otherwise was going to be abandoned or severely restricted. More than 300 of the nation’s 545 short lines connect to two or more Class I carriers, and this provides a significant competitive advantage to short line-served shippers. Enacting regulations that reduce our revenues will severely restrict our ability to maintain and rehabilitate these competitive alternatives.
Short line railroad transactions were predicated on established economics. Short line buyers purchased a given amount of traffic and a presumed rate. The goal is always to earn enough to improve and grow that service, and virtually all of today’s short lines have done so. Many of the ideas being discussed in the debate could destroy the economics of our transactions.
For instance, mandated terminal access would allow another carrier to service our best customers for a trackage rights fee. A typical trackage rights fee is no more than the direct cost associated with maintaining a particular segment of track. That is not what the short line owner paid for in the first instance, and allowing that to occur will turn these transactions upside down to the detriment of all the remaining shippers on the line.
A reduction in Class I investment and service will hit short lines hard. To the extent regulatory changes result in reduced Class I investment and service, those reductions will occur first on those line segments with the least traffic—where most short lines operate. This will reduce our traffic and our revenues, and we will in turn be forced to reduce investment and curtail service.
It is no secret that the impetus for these hearings is the unsuccessful effort of Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) to craft a compromise piece of legislation during the 2010 Congress. While the short line railroad industry had serious concerns with portions of that legislation, it needs to be noted that Sen. Rockefeller was attentive to those concerns.
Sen. Rockefeller and the Commerce Committee devoted substantial time listening to and understanding short line positions. In many instances portions, of the proposed legislation were altered to address those concerns. In every instance, they did their very best to understand the intricate financial and operating relationships between the big and small railroads.
We sincerely appreciate that effort and we hope the STB will give us that same consideration.
Mike Ogborn is Managing Director of OmniTRAX, Inc., a transportation management company that provides management services to 17 short line railroads and other transportation companies in Canada and the United States.
Woody Allen once said, “I took a speed-reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes. It involves Russia.” Speed is compelling. From restaurant service to medical treatment, we use speed to define quality. Transportation is no exception. But as Allen illustrates, by focusing solely on speed you can miss other essential elements. U.S. passenger rail is a case in point.
Headlines often blare about the speed of European or Asian high speed trains. But those vaunted speeds are rarely sustained in practice, due to operating costs, logistic constraints, and maintenance requirements. The unspoken story is overall performance—efficient, reliable, and comfortable ways of getting passengers to their destinations, using rail as one well-integrated component of an overall journey. But performance can be hard to define and even harder to quantify. Speed becomes the defining principle by default. Unfortunately, U.S. passenger rail cannot afford to live by that definition. To advance passenger rail here, advocates should focus on high-performance rail (HPR).
Things are different on this continent, and headlong implementation of European or Asian-style HSR may not be the best strategic choice for us. Different transportation corridors have unique needs and constraints. Choosing appropriate rail solutions by corridor is the key to our successful implementation of passenger rail. Appropriate phasing is critical to deliver early, visible gains and long-term potential. Credit the Obama Administration and the FRA for embracing that principle. Modifying the original High Speed Rail Strategic Plan, the FRA now recognizes three corridor categories: Core Express, 125 mph or faster; Regional, 90–125 mph;, and Emerging, below 90 mph.
This refocus is practical. Passenger rail is not a one-size-fits-all business. From political realities to legislative and budget constraints to market-capture issues, unique corridor conditions prevail throughout the U.S. Recognizing these complexities, the FRA has endorsed HPR for passenger rail. What exactly is HPR?
HPR is an approach that delivers an appropriate rail system for each market, and measures that system in terms of ride quality, frequency, reliability, safety, ontime performance, amenities, station environments, local transit and airport connectivity, and yes, speed. Using these criteria collectively puts rail in a new light. Rather than being a foreign, elitist, or extravagant expense, it becomes an attractive, effective, and affordable transportation alternative. Passenger rail can thus be transformed from an abstract indulgence to an urgent local priority.
HPR optimizes solutions by addressing the needs and constraints of individual corridors. In one corridor, 90–110 mph on a shared freight asset may be best. In the Northeast Corridor (where the existing system already operates at capacity), a separate, dedicated HSR system is preferable. In other corridors, new commuter service on existing freight assets might be the optimal solution (and HSR could develop later, once ridership is established).
HPR is also cost-effective—an important consideration since infrastructure funding is limited and the competition for funds is intense. Money is especially tight for major capital projects like HSR, for obvious reasons. For most Americans, HSR is a distant, theoretical construct. At full build-out, it would only capture a small share of the overall travel market. Taxpayers are reluctant to fund a system they perceive as “fast trains for businesspeople and tourists.”
Such perceptions have unfairly damaged the case for HSR; that small overall share is a critical, large share in key corridors, and HSR would free up capacity in other elements of the larger multimodal transportation network. HPR mitigates the perception problem by focusing on performance, efficiency, and corridor-appropriate solutions that benefit everyone. We need passenger rail travel to become a reality again for many taxpayers. And once the country accepts HPR, the step up to HSR will be easier.
Speed is compelling. But it is not always the best criterion. In truth, most transportation modes actually “sell” performance. Airlines never talk about how fast their planes fly, but they are expert at selling performance—legroom, in-flight movies, airport lounges, and so forth. We must bring that perspective to passenger rail by promoting HPR. By taking a holistic approach to rail, by shrewdly and fairly apportioning limited funds, the FRA is, in effect, advocating high-performance rail.
Chris Taylor is the New York–based deputy director for high speed rail at AECOM.
By William C. Vantuono, Editor
Dire and unintended consequences could ensue if this legislation becomes law. Every stakeholder in the industry, freight and passenger, will suffer—shippers included.
This special edition of Railway Age is designed to reacquaint Congress and other opinion leaders with why the Staggers Act of 1980 was passed in the first place, and what it has accomplished—particularly, the capital investments that have enabled growth, productivity, and reliable, high-quality service. The reality is that most of the legislators who were present for the signing of Staggers are no longer around. And, almost no one in Congress remembers the dark days of the 1960s and 1970s, when America’s railroads were on the brink of collapse, and nationalization was seriously considered.
Railway Age is not new to this fight. More than a half-century ago—Oct. 7, 1957, to be exact—we published our landmark “Outrage” edition, which spelled out how the combined effects of government regulation and government-funded competition had seriously weakened the railroads.
Masterminded by Executive Editor Joe W. Kizzia, “Outrage” went into more than one million reprints and is widely credited with jump-starting the movement within the industry and on Capitol Hill that resulted in Staggers 23 years later. The similarity between our two magazine covers is intentional, only this time, we’re trying to stop history from repeating itself.
“By stripping away needless and costly regulation in favor of marketplace forces wherever possible, this act will help assure a strong and healthy future for our nation’s railroads and the men and women who work for them,” President Jimmy Carter said when he signed Staggers in one of his last acts as chief executive. “It will benefit shippers throughout the country by encouraging railroads to improve their equipment and better tailor their service to shipper needs. America’s consumers will benefit, for rather than face the prospect of continuing deterioration of rail freight service, consumers can be assured of improved railroads delivering their goods with dispatch.”
Staggers, as we well know, did exactly that.
There is no sensible reason to turn back the clock—especially now, when America’s economic recovery requires investment in efficient transportation. Why destroy nearly 30 years of steady, hard-fought progress?
Our special report, “Renaissance—or Retreat?”, represents an industry that speaks with one voice.
Good design, which evokes feelings of excitement, interest, and admiration, is something that entices people to purchase a certain automobile, or a piece of furniture, as much as price and quality.
Good design will also encourage people to use and appreciate rail, mainly passenger, but also freight.
With railways, the caveat of “form follows function” is especially important. A vehicle or facility should be attractive and ergonomically sound. Equally important, it cannot be difficult or expensive to maintain. Also, it must be safe. It’s not easy to to blend all these requirements into a single package like a railcar or locomotive or a station. That’s where an industrial designer comes in.
My good friend and colleague, industrial designer Cesar Vergara (above right), in the grand tradition of legendary railway industrial designers like Raymond Loewy, Henry Dreyfuss, Otto Kuhler, and Paul Philippe Cret, has been contributing his designs to this industry for the better part of 30 years. Among his more notable designs are Amtrak’s Genesis locomotive and Cascades Talgo train, NJ Transit’s PL42AC locomotive, and Metro-North’s new M8 (pictured). These are just a few of the “Vergaras” (my word, not Cesar’s) out there. “If it costs a million, it should look like a million,” Cesar likes to say. “It doesn’t cost any more to design a railway vehicle or structure that is aesthetically appealing than it does to design one that’s unattractive or uncomfortable.”
Since he graduated from Konstfack University College of Arts, Crafts, and Design in Sweden, Cesar Vergara has been plying his craft for others—National Railways of Mexico, Amtrak, Walter Dorwin Teague Associates, NJ Transit, Jacobs. Blessed with a personality as engaging as his creative spirit, he has (finally!) formed his own industrial design studio, Vergarastudio. With the railway industry in the midst of a renaissance, and passenger rail—including high speed—the priority of an enlightened (finally!) Administration in Washington, Cesar’s timing couldn’t be better.
Functioning in an advisory capacity to Vergarastudio are highly respected industry veterans like Jeffrey Warsh, Donald Nelson, and Peter Cannito. Like Cesar, they believe strongly in the importance of good design.
Access to great design by one of this industry’s most talented practitioners is a mouse click away at www.vergarastudio.com, an email to email@example.com, or a phone call to (203) 241-5264.
Most catastrophes don’t happen as the result of a single failure. There’s usually a series of oversights or smaller failures that eventually lead to a much larger, more awful occurrence.
Last month’s tragic wreck on the Washington Metro’s Red Line, a rush-hour rear-end collision at speed that claimed nine lives and caused numerous serious injuries, resulted from a combination of factors. While it will take several months for the National Transportation Safety Board to issue an official report on the crash, we can piece together a few parts of the puzzle.
The crash itself, NTSB investigators said the next day, resulted from a failure of the Metro’s automatic train control system to detect the presence of the train that was hit. That train had come to a full stop just north of the Red Line’s Fort Totten station. This condition is known by signal engineers as a blackout.
Train operator Jeanice McMillan, 42, had no chance to stop the following train as it rounded a curve at speed. She hit the emergency brake button, but it was too late. She and eight passengers perished as her train, equipped with the Metro’s oldest, original 1000 Series railcars, slammed into the stopped consist, telescoped, and tore open like an aluminum soda can. Both trains were operating in automatic mode.
While the train control system failure apparently caused the wreck, the dead and the injured may have had a much better chance had the train been equipped not with 1970s-vintage 1000 Series cars, but with the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority’s newer railcars, which are built to recent, much stronger crashworthiness standards. In 2006, the NTSB recommended that WMATA accelerate retirement of its 1000 Series cars, but the agency said it could not. Why? As WMATA wrote to NTSB three years ago, it was “constrained by tax advantage leases, which require [us] to keep the 1000 Series cars in service at least until the end of 2014.”
Those tax advantage leases, better known as sale-in/lease-out or lease-in/lease-out, were, until outlawed in 2004, a method of financing that enabled funding-constrained public transit agencies to acquire new equipment that they otherwise would not have been able to afford and sorely needed funds for operations and maintenance.
As the Wall Street Journal reported on June 26, “Such agreements . . . typically involved banks buying or leasing municipal assets such as railcars and leasing them back to their original owners. They enabled the banks to claim tax deductions on the depreciation. Those deductions were otherwise worthless to the [transit agencies], since they don’t owe taxes. In return, the agencies got large slugs of cash. [WMATA] estimates it netted around $100 million from its deals. . . If the agency had wanted to break the leases . . . it would have had to pay penalties and fees on top of the cost of buying newer railcars.”
What we have here is an extreme case of unintended consequences. Money doesn’t necessarily buy safety, but it will pay for things like new transit cars and communications-based train control technology that could lessen the effects of a wreck or even prevent its occurrence.
One could forcefully argue that if WMATA, like most transit agencies, didn’t have such a hard time acquiring operating and capital support from its political masters, it may not have had to depend upon complex financing mechanisms to acquire new and better equipment.